Gotlandia II

The Gotlandia II was built on the experience gained by Gotlandsbolaget from the slightly smaller Gotlandia, nicknamed ‘The French’. The Gotlandia II was deployed on the Gotland service for the 2006 summer season. Following the delivery of the large LNG ferries, the Gotlandia II became redundant and after a short time on the summer route to Västervik she was eventually sold to Greece.

Gotlandia II in Port of Visby. Photo: Gotlandsbolaget

Improved Gotlandia type

When it became clear that Gotlandsbolaget would resume the Gotland service after a ten-year absence, a completely new type of vessel was ordered – a single-hulled high-speed vessel with a top speed of 35 knots. The newbuilding was delivered in 1999 from France with the name Gotland, but she was later renamed Gotlandia. She completed the Visby-Nynäshamn route in half the time of the traditional car and passenger ferries Visby and Thjelvar.

After gaining experience with this type of vessel over a few years, Gotlandsbolaget ordered a new vessel of a similar type in the summer of 2004. The concept was similar, but the capacity was about ten percent larger and the speed slightly higher. This time the order was placed with the Fincantieri Naval shipyard in Genoa, Italy. Fincantieri Naval had also designed the ship, and construction began at the shipyard in Riva Trigoso, 50 km south of Genoa. However, equipping and completion of the ship would take place at the Mugiano shipyard in La Spezia, another 50 km south.

Anders Larsson, technical manager at Gotlandsbolaget, told the local newspaper Gotlands Tidningar:

A little more spacious, a little more air and volume with a larger caféteria kiosk and children’s cinema. There will be more cash registers and larger sales areas. Technically, we have tried to adopt what is good about Gotlandia. But there will be other machines because hers is not as reliable as expected. The engine power is higher, from 7000 to 9000 kilowatts, but the ferry will initially run at the same speed as its predecessor. Waterjet technology from Rolls Royce is also used in this boat.

On February 28, 2005, the keel was laid at the Riva Trigoso shipyard and on December 22, the ship was moved within the shipyard area by cranes from the construction hall to the loading dock. From the loading dock, the ship was then put on a barge which was towed to the Mugiano shipyard where the barge with the ship was placed in a floating dock on December 23. On December 30, the dock was filled with water and the newbuilding was launched.

The ship was then towed to the equipment quay for completion. After a handful of test trips, the ship was christened Gotlandia II on April 18, 2006 by godmother Marieann Nilsson, in the presence of, among others, Sweden’s ambassador to Italy. The following day, Gotlandia II was delivered to Gotlandsbolaget, but it was still another month before the voyage to the home port began under the command of captain Mats Thor.

On July 7, 2006 at 07:05 the ship left on its maiden voyage from Visby to Nynäshamn. As early as July 10, however, the ship had to be taken out of service due to a minor fire in the machinery. Pending analysis of the causes of the fire, Gotlandia II was replaced by Gotlandia, but on August 24 Gotlandia II was put back into service. The cause of the fire had then been identified as a loose fuel injection valve, so it was decided to replace all the valve bolts with a stronger model.

The collision with ferry Gotland

At 11.17 on July 23, 2009, the Gotlandia II and the Gotland collided in the entrance to Nynäshamn. There was dense fog in the area and the Gotland had just left the quay in Nynäshamn and was heading around the Finnhällorna shoal. Gotlandia II was to wait outside the strait between Brunnsviksholmens lighthouse and Finnhällorna until Gotland had passed and then go to the quay in Nynäshamn. However, the Gotlandia II did not succeed in conclude a turn to port, but came in front of the bow of the Gotland and the collision was a fact.

On the Gotlandia II, 33 passengers were injured in the collision, ten of whom had to be taken to hospital for treatment. However, none of these were seriously injured and none of the crew were injured. However, Gotlandia II suffered major damage and was taken out of service for the rest of the season.

The front page of Svenska Dagbladet the day after the collision.

The accident commission described the sequence of events:

The bridge crew of the Gotlandia II consisted of the master and chief mate. Both were experienced naval officers, but relatively inexperienced in their respective positions on board this ship. It was also the first time they worked together. The master had extensive experience on other waterjet powered vessels – he had also worked as chief mate on the company’s HSC vessels for two previous seasons. However, this was his first season as master in the company. He was hired as master only in mid-June 2009. The chief officer, who was maneuvering the ship, had very extensive experience in coastal navigation and ship maneuvering from his regular work as master of cargo ships for more than 10 years. However, he had only worked on board for about 15 days before the accident and therefore had very little experience in maneuvering HSC vessels with water jet propulsion.

Gotlandia II after the collision. Photo from the accident commission report

When the Gotlandia II was about to pass a ship at anchor just north of the fairway, the crew lost their orientation in the poor visibility, partly due to various disturbances. It was not possible to cancel the port tack used to steer towards the quay area in Nynäshamn, which had become too sharp when passing the anchorage. This meant that Gotlandia II involuntarily steered in front of Gotland, which resulted in the vessels colliding.

Gotlandia II departed Nynäshamn on July 25 for Norrköping to be laid up pending repairs. On September 25, Gotlandia II left Norrköping to be taken to the Öresund shipyard in Landskrona for repairs. There was no hurry for the repairs as she was not to be used before the peak season, but the damage was extensive and the final bill amounted to over SEK 20 million.

On March 12, 2010, Gotlandia II left the yard after repairs and docked at Visby in anticipation of entering service later in the spring.

Gotlandia II. Photo: Gotlandsbolaget

The aftermath

The accident commission summarized the causes of the accident:

The cause of the collision was that there were deficiencies in the conditions for the navigators on Gotlandia II to carry out the voyage in question in a safe manner, taking into account the prevailing visibility conditions, experience, training and education, as well as the company’s safety procedures and safety management. On Gotland, information was provided from the bridge to the passengers and crew about what had happened, etc. immediately after the collision. On Gotlandia II, no such information was issued. Due to the lack of information, the passengers were in a state of uncertainty about the seriousness of the situation and what to do. For the crew, who were trained for an event of the type that occurred, the absence of information meant that there was no clear signal to activate the crisis organization. This led to ambiguity and uncertainty about what to do.

Had the master of the Gotland II breached good seamanship in the legal sense and thus being responsible for a maritime accident? The prosecution argued so, and charged the master based on four different allegations:

  • The master had maintained too high a speed in relation to the applicable permit when entering Nynäshamn.
  • The master had maintained a speed that was too high considering the circumstances, i.e. approaching the port entrance, fog, meeting with another ship and an anchored vessel in the area.
  • The master had, without giving clear orders, left the chief officer to maneuver the ship alone, even though the chief officer had never done this maneuver in the prevailing conditions before, while the master went out on the bridge wing.
  • The master had not had sufficient control of the vessel’s position, course and speed.

The District Court did not agree with the prosecution’s claims – after hearing witness statements and presenting other evidence. It is true that the Gotlandia II had maintained too high a speed when entering Nynäshamn, but this was 16 minutes before the collision, and the speed had quickly been reduced to less than 14 knots, so the initial speed did not affect the later course of events. The investigation also showed that the Gotlandia II, when passing the anchored vessel, had a speed of less than 7 knots – which is close to the stop of the maneuvering capability of a water jet ship – and then increased to a speed of about 9 knots just before the collision in order to get better steering capability. According to the Master, the Gotlandia II was virtually stationary at the time of the collision.

Furthermore, it turned out to be practice on Gotlandia II that the chief officer – and not the master – maneuvered the ship during the route in question, and there were no indications other than that the master had given clear orders to the chief officer. That the master went out on the bridge wing to ensure that the Gotlandia II was ready for the anchored vessel could not be blamed, but instead indicated that he had shown good seamanship. Moreover, he had essentially the same navigation instruments there as the chief officer had on the bridge. According to the District Court, there was nothing in the investigation that indicated that the master had reason to assume that the vessel had lost its position and course. His own opinion that there had been a delay in the gyro information to the radar which had caused him to assess that they had a more westerly course than they actually had was supported by the chief officer’s testimony. It was also pointed out that the Swedish Accident Investigation Board in its report had not been able to find any single circumstance that alone constituted an explanation for the collision.

All in all, the District Court thus found that the prosecution had not shown that the master had acted negligently and failed in good seamanship and the charge was dismissed.

Gotlandia II. Photo: Gotlandsbolaget

Traffic to Västervik

With the delivery of the first LNG ferry from China, m/s Visborg, Gotlandia II became redundant in the concessionary service. In the summer of 2019, Gotlandia II was therefore put into service between Visby and Västervik, which Destination Gotland operated without state aid. In the previous year, Gotlandia, i.e. “The French”, operated the service, but now when Gotlandia II has become available, she replaced the older Gotlandia which remained idle.

The intention was that Gotlandia II would maintain the service on Västervik also in the summer of 2020. But the Corona pandemic intervened, and in June Destination Gotland declared that the service was canceled. The CEO explained:

During this year, which is a special year, we choose to focus on our two main routes Oskarshamn and Nynäshamn. We want to protect our own staff and ensure that we can maintain traffic during the high season in a good way. On Västervik, we have operated the slightly smaller vessel. It is much better from the point of view of infection control to use the large vessels in traffic.

Deck 6. Photo: Jonaldos (CC BY-SA)

Heading for the Mediterranean

In the summers of 2021 and 2022, Gotlandia II again operated on the Västervik line, but in February 2023 Destination Gotland announced that the line would not be operated in the coming high season due to high fuel prices and on March 31, Gotlandsbolaget announced that the vessel had been sold.

On April 30, the vessel left the port of Visby under the Greek flag and with the new name Golden Princess for its new owners Golden Star Ferries in Greece.

Timeline

2006-04-19Delivered as Gotlandia II to Rederi AB Gotland, Visby.
2023-03-31Sold to Golden Star Ferries, Pireaus. Renamed Golden Princess.

Specification

Lenght121,91 m
Beam17,05 m
Gross tonnage6554 GT
Deadweight580 ton
Machinery4 x MAN V28/33D, 36000 kW, 40 knots
Pax780
Capacity160 cars or 8 busses+100 cars
Call Sign/IMOSKWR/9328015

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